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Introduction
In 2008 This paper contributes to the extant literature in three main aspects. First, consistent with the efficient market hypothesis that asset prices only react to new information, this work investigates the impact of the surprise component of LSAP announcements, rather than the mere presence of a LSAP statement.
Moreover, the LSAP news is incorporated into a formal regression framework, thus controlling for the unanticipated policy rate decision and statement regarding the future policy path. By doing so, this econometric specification allows to explicitly control for the "signalling channel", i.e. LSAP announcements might affect asset prices because market participants learn about the underlying state of the economy and about how the central bank might react to these future developments. 2 Second, this paper conducts a crosscountry comparison of the effectiveness of the LSAP, by also evaluating the experience of the U.K. The empirical evidence suggests that the impact of the Bank of England's (BoE) Quantitative Easing (QE) program on U.K. asset prices has been similar to that found in the United States. Third, this paper uses highfrequency data to examine the response of asset prices to conventional and unconventional monetary policy.
There are several reasons why tick-by-tick event-study analysis is more appropriate than a lower-frequency (daily) study. First, by employing a narrow 30-min window surrounding the monetary policy announcements, I perform the closest thing to a natural experiment in macroeconomics, and thus I can isolate the effects of monetary policy on asset prices. Second, high-frequency data surmount the endogeneity-reverse causality problem that is pervasive with lower-frequency data. Finally, in a short enough window around the announcement, the monetary news should be the only information hitting the market. For this reason, the regression residual errors are smaller, and the precision of the point estimates is greatly enhanced, compared to those obtained by a low-frequency regression model. This issue is particularly relevant in a high-volatility state, such as during the recent financial crisis.
The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, I identify the surprise component of LSAP announcements by reading a number of Financial Times (FT) articles written before and after each FOMC meeting. Then, I document economically important effects of asset purchases on U.S.
asset prices. I find that in a narrow window around the FOMC meeting the cumulative financial market impact of the unanticipated announcement of asset purchases in terms of their federal funds-rate-equivalent, i.e. change in the funds rate that would have the same financial market impact as a given quantity of asset purchases, is substantial, ranging between 0 (for 3-month yields) and 197 basis points (for 10-year yields), with the response of stock prices and foreign exchanges lying in this interval. These point estimates are, however, surrounded by considerable uncertainty. I also investigate the extent to which the effects of asset purchases are different compared to standard changes in the fed funds target rate. By looking at the crossasset reactions, this work concludes that the effects of asset purchases are not statistically different from an unanticipated cut in the fed funds target rate. Hence, this evidence suggests that LSAP is simply another tool to provide stimulus to the economy when the policy rate is stuck at the zero-lower bound. Second, the robustness of these findings is examined along several dimensions. For instance, I consider different estimators, such as members of the class of generalized empirical likelihood (GEL) estimators, and a different identification of the target and news shock. This sensitivity analysis corroborates the core finding that the Fed's LSAP were extremely successful in bringing down long-term yields, boosting stock prices, and reducing the value of the U.S. dollar when the policy rate reached the zero lower bound. Third, I find that the cumulative effects of asset purchases conducted by the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) resulted in a reduction of long-term yields and an average depreciation of the British pound of about 2%. Hence, the response of U.K. asset prices (except for stock prices) is broadly in line with the reaction of U.S. asset prices to the Fed's asset purchases. By looking at the cross-asset reactions, the effects of gilt purchases are not statistically different from an unanticipated cut in the BoE policy rate for 10-year gilts and exchange rates, whereas the impact of purchases on 5-year gilts and especially FTSE 100 stock index is significantly smaller.
By looking at the asset price reactions to the Federal Reserve's monetary policy, this paper is related to different strands of the literature. A number of studies investigate the influence of the Fed's unanticipated policy rate decisions on U.S. asset prices. For instance, Kuttner (2001) estimates the impact of monetary policy actions on Treasury-bill, note, and bond yields, and finds that interest rates' response to anticipated target rate changes is small, while their response to unanticipated changes is large and highly significant.
Beechey and Wright (2009) look at the response of nominal and index-linked bond yields to macroeconomic and monetary news announcements. They find that yields jumped up on the stronger-than-expected data and down on the weaker-than-expected data, with the reactions complete within 10-min. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) analyze the impact of changes in monetary policy on equity prices, and document that, on average, a hypothetical unanticipated 25-basis-point cut in the Federal funds rate target is associated with about a 1% increase in broad stock indexes. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) and Faust, Rogers, Wang and Wright (2007) examine the intraday response of the U.S. spot exchange rate to real-time U.S. monetary and macroeconomic news. In particular, they find that that surprise changes in the federal funds target rate produce conditional mean jumps, and conclude that exchange-rate dynamics are linked to fundamentals. All in all, this strand of research has reached a consensus that U.S. asset prices respond strongly to unanticipated fed funds target rate decisions.
The financial market impact of central bank communication, as opposed to monetary policy actions, has recently received increasing attention in the academic literature, both theoretically and empirically (see Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, De Haan and Jansen, 2008 , for an excellent survey). Rosa (2011a and 2011b) examines the effects of FOMC's decisions and statements on the level and volatility of U.S. stock and volatility indices, and the U.S. dollar exchange rates using an intraday event-study analysis. He finds that both policy decisions and communication have economically large and highly significant effects on stock prices and exchange rates, with the surprise component of statements accounting for most of the explainable variation in asset returns in response to monetary policy. This work shares the finding that FOMC news have a significant impact on U.S. asset returns (in the aftermath of announcements), and goes one step further by
showing that the surprise component of LSAP announcements, as opposed to the surprise component of its policy decisions and statements, greatly adds to our understanding of the response of asset prices to monetary policy. Moreover, the present paper extends the sample period up to June 2011, thus covering the financial turbulence that started in August 2007. This exercise is interesting because it assesses the effectiveness of the monetary transmission mechanism in periods of heightened financial stress.
A final area of the rapidly growing empirical literature is on the financial market impact of the LSAP program. Table 1 summarizes some of the choices researchers have made with respect to the data and estimation method used, and reports their main findings. Overall, the empirical evidence supports the conclusion that LSAP reduce U.S. long-term interest rates. Appendix B outlines the data cleaning procedure used to delete from ultra-high-frequency time series observations that do not reflect the market activity.
Data

Asset price data
The high-frequency dataset on U.S. asset prices includes nominal and inflation-indexed bonds, stocks and U.S. dollar spot exchange rates, and covers the period May 1999 -June 2011.
I consider 5-min quotes of yields to maturity on the most recently issued "on-the-run" 3-and 6-month, 2-, 5-and 10-year nominal Treasury notes, and 5-and 10-year Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS). The stock market data consists of the 5-min observations on the Standard & Poor's 500 cash index, whereas the exchange rate data consist of the 5-min observations for the U.S. dollar versus the euro (EUR), the Canadian dollar (CAD), the British pound (GBP), the Swiss franc (CHF), and the Japanese yen (JPY).
For the analysis of the BoE I consider the 5-min yields on the 5-and 10-year U.K. government bonds (gilts), and prices on the FTSE 100 stock index and spot exchange rate of the British pound against the USD, EUR, CAD, CHF, and JPY. Midpoints of bid/ask quotes, observed at the end of each 5-min interval, are used to generate the series of (equally-spaced) 5-min continuously compounded exchange rate returns. For instance, the 10:00 observation in a given day stands for the last quotation from within the interval 9:55:00-9:59:59.
The data for each day are stacked in serial order, but only the asset price returns in a thirty-minute window bracketing every FOMC announcement are used in the econometric analysis. 3 If no trade occurs in a given 5-min interval, I use the price from the previous interval, as long as the previous price is quoted within the last twenty minutes. Throughout this paper, I measure exchange rates in units of the domestic currency needed to buy one unit of the foreign currency, so that a negative change implies an appreciation of the U.S. dollar.
3 Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) and Bandi and Russell (2008) argue that 5-min returns provide a reasonable balance between sampling too frequently (and confounding price reactions with market microstructure noise, such as the bid-ask bounce, staleness, price discreteness, and the clustering of quotes), and sampling too infrequently (and blurring price reactions to news).
Monetary news
The news data consist of the surprise component of both central bank words and deeds: the surprise change to the current federal funds target rate, and the surprise component of FOMC's statements (meant to capture revisions to the path of the future target federal funds rate).
Following Kuttner (2001) , in this paper the surprise component of the FOMC's decision, the target shock (ܶܵ), is defined as the (appropriately scaled) change in the current month federal funds futures rate in a narrow window around FOMC announcements (spanning from 5-min prior to 25-min after the policy announcement).
As pointed out by Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) and Rosa (2011a Rosa ( , 2011b , since May 1999 the FOMC has accompanied its federal funds target rate decisions by press statements regarding the likely direction of future monetary policy. For instance, the FOMC shares its views on the economic outlook by indicating whether the FOMC believes that the risks for the economy in the foreseeable future are weighted toward "conditions that may generate heightened inflation pressures" (hawkish statement), or "the risks are balanced" (neutral announcement), or "risks are weighted toward economic weakness" (dovish statement).
To take adequately into account this forward-looking information, I consider the unexpected component of Four additional caveats of the methodology should be emphasized. First, the ternary dummy ‫ܵܲܣܵܮ‬ ௧ represents a coarse measure of the LSAP surprise. In particular, it measures the direction of the news, but cannot capture its magnitude. In other words, the explanatory variable contains a measurement error, and the likely consequence is an underestimate of the LSAP coefficient, known as attenuation bias. Hence, the reported point estimates of the LSAP coefficient should be interpreted as a lower-bound of the consistent estimate of the effectiveness of LSAP. Second, a related point is that due to the limited sample of LSAP announcements, it is impossible to further decompose the LSAP news into a timing surprise (i.e. advancement or postponement of a more-or-less inevitable asset purchase) and a level surprise about the expected path of LSAP. Moreover, I cannot disentangle the extent to which different maturities and types of unanticipated bond purchases, such as purchases of housing agency debt, MBS and longer-term Treasury securities, affect asset prices. Third, the LSAP surprise can be nonzero even when there was no LSAP decision as long as market participants placed at least some probability on there being a purchase announcement. If this type of LSAP news is orthogonal to asset returns, the exclusion of these observations should not affect the consistency of the econometric estimates. However, this sample selection reduces the efficiency of the estimates, and thus works against finding any significance influence of LSAP purchases on driving U.S. asset prices. A final drawback of relying on newspapers articles to determine which statements were surprises is that the journalists' interpretation of the FOMC event may have been influenced, 4 Some recent studies assessing the impact of financial news media on asset prices include Bernanke, Reinhart and Sack (2004) , Ellingsen and Soderstrom (2004) , Tetlock (2007) and Loughran and McDonald (2011) . Table 2 presents a selection of descriptive statistics for all the variables used in this paper. 
3.
The response of the U.S. asset prices to monetary policy
Baseline estimation results
What is the impact of the Fed's conventional and unconventional monetary policy on the U.S. asset prices? To answer this, I estimate the following baseline regression model separately for each asset price using only FOMC meeting days:
where ܴ ௧ is the asset price return in the 30-min window surrounding the release of the FOMC statement (from 5-min before to 25-min after the event). The error term ߝ ௧ represents other factors that affect asset prices on event times. These factors are assumed to be orthogonal to the explanatory variables of the regression. The novel aspect of Equation (2) is that it investigates whether unanticipated LSAP statements affects U.S. asset prices, after controlling for the surprise component of the Fed's target rate decision and news about its future policy tilt. Table 3 reports the estimation results for each U.S. asset price. Each regression is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) with White-t statistics (White, 1980) to account for heteroskedasticity in the residuals. 5 Rather than commenting on each regression individually, in the interest of brevity I summarize the most interesting aspects of the empirical results. The sign of the estimated coefficients on the target shock (ܶܵ) is, as expected, positive for nominal and inflation-indexed bond yields, and negative for stock and exchange rate returns. For instance, a one percentage point surprise tightening in the federal funds rate causes a significant 55 (35) basis point increase on the 6-month (5-year) Treasury note yields, a 5.3% drop in the SP 500 stock index, and a 2.7% appreciation of the EUR-USD exchange rate in the half-an-hour bracketing the event. These magnitudes are similar to those reported in previous studies, such as Kuttner (2001) Table 3 is, however, the estimates of the effects of the LSAP news on U.S. asset prices. As can be seen in the table, the coefficient of the LSAP shock is positive for bond yields, and negative for stock and exchange rate returns. For all asset prices, with the notable exception of short-term, the LSAP surprise is statistically significant. For the 10-year Treasury and TIPS yields the LSAPS coefficient is marginally insignificant at the 10% level. I find that an unanticipated dovish LSAP announcement is associated with a decline in the 5-year Treasury yields of roughly 9 basis points, a stock price increase of 0.9%, and a depreciation of the U.S. dollar against major currencies of about 1%. This magnitude is substantial, especially because it should be seen as a lower bound of the impact of asset purchases on U.S. asset prices. 6 Furthermore, because of the unanticipated LSAP announcements long-term yields went down by a total of roughly 30-50 basis points, stock prices increased by 3%, and the value of the U.S. dollar fell by a total of roughly 3%. All in all, this implies that according to the estimates reported in Table 3 the cumulative financial market impact of the LSAP program in terms of their federal funds-rateequivalent ranges between 0 (for 3-month Treasury yields) and 197 (for 10-year Treasury note) basis points, depending on the particular asset price. 7 These ballpark figures square well with those reported by the N.Y.
Fed President Dudley (2010), who suggests that "$500 billion of purchases would provide about as much stimulus as a reduction in the federal funds rate of between half a point and three quarters of a point. But this estimate is sensitive to how long market participants expected the Fed to hold on to these assets", and the Chairman Bernanke (2011), according to whom "the second round of asset purchases probably lowered longer-term interest rates approximately 10 to 30 basis points (…) roughly equivalent in terms of its effect on the economy to a 40 to 120 basis point reduction in the federal funds rate."
6 In the empirical exercise I consider only unanticipated LSAP announcements made on FOMC meeting days, rather than all LSAP announcements. In addition to stock effects, there are also flows effects as documented by D'Amico and King (2010) . 7 The cumulative stimulus of the LSAP program, expressed in federal funds rate-equivalent, is computed as ܰ ή ߚ ௌௌ Ȁ ߚ ்ௌ , where ܰ is the sum of LSAP ternary dummies, and I multiply the ratio by ͳͲͲ to express it in basis points. To assess the degree of uncertainty in this point estimate, I compute empirical confidence bands using simulations. More specifically, I take ͳͲǡͲͲͲ draws from the joint distribution of ሼߚ ்ௌ ǡ ߚ ௌௌ ሽ, and compute the above proportion implied for each asset pair. Finally, I take the 2.5% and 97.5% percentiles.
Finally, to shed further light on the economic importance of the effects of asset purchases on asset prices, I have compared the goodness of fit, as measured by the adjusted R 2 , of Equation (2) to two baseline specifications: the first one includes as explanatory variables only a constant and the target shock, whereas the second one includes a constant, the target and news shock. By including the surprise component of the FOMC statement, the adjusted R 2 substantially increases. The novel feature of Table 3 , however, is the dramatic improvement in the fit once the LSAP shock is included in the regression specification. Hence, the effect of the LSAP shock is not only statistically different from zero and of the "expected" sign, but also quantitatively important. For instance, for the EUR exchange rate, the adjusted R 2 statistics increases from 5% to 19% by including the news shock, and to 41% by further including the LSAP shock, whereas for the 10-year Treasury note the adjusted R 2 increases from 10% to 29% by including the LSAP shock. Therefore, most of the explainable variation in U.S. asset prices in response to the Fed's monetary policy is due to unanticipated FOMC statements and announcements about future LSAP rather than to unexpected changes in the federal funds rate target. Table 3 here
To examine the robustness of the above estimation results, and in line with some existing studies such as Gagnon, Raskin, Remache and Sack (2011) Treasury bond yields, boost stock prices and reduce the spot value of the U.S. dollar. Interestingly, the point estimates remain very close to those reported in Table 3 .
How unconventional are LSAP?
The above findings raise the important question of how unconventional LSAP compare to standard changes in the fed funds target rate. In other words, to what extent asset purchases can be thought as a completely new instrument or as a more mundane monetary policy tool to circumvent the zero bound on the actual fed funds target rate? To further investigate this issue, I look at the magnitude of the impact of LSAP surprises relative to target shocks across different U.S. asset prices. In particular, I pool the sample across all U.S. asset prices, and I estimate this model by Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method to accounts for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in the errors across equations. Then I test whether the effects of the LSAP program (in terms of their federal-funds-rate-equivalent) are the same across assets.
The null hypothesis that the ratio between the LSAPS and TS coefficients is the same across assets is strongly rejected by the data (p-value equals 0.007). Hence, this evidence indicates that the financial market impact of asset purchases on U.S. asset prices is statistically different from the impact of unanticipated cut in the fed funds target rate.
To shed further light on how the effectiveness of LSAP compare to the normal pattern of conventional monetary policy, I consider all pair-wise combination of assets, and then I test whether the effects of the LSAP program in terms of their federal-funds-rate-equivalent are the same for that particular asset pair. More formally, I estimate by SUR method the following system of equations:
where ܴ ௧ ሺሻ is the return on asset i, and the rest of the notation is the same as above. Then I test the null Table 4 reports the Wald test (χ 2 statistic) for each asset pair. For most combinations the null hypothesis that the effects of unanticipated asset purchases, in terms of their federalfunds-rate-equivalent, are not statistically different from each other cannot be rejected at standard confidence levels. The only exceptions are represented by short-term interest rates (3-and 6-month Treasury bills and 2-year Treasury notes), which do not significantly react to asset purchases, compared to 5-year nominal or inflation-indexed bonds, stock prices, and exchange rates, which do react. To a lesser extent, also U.S. stock prices respond significantly less to LSAP shocks compared to exchange rates. These findings indicate that the mapping of LSAP in terms of federal-funds-rate-equivalent critically depends on the asset class considered. Thus, the effectiveness of LSAP may be understated / overstated depending on the particular asset class that has been used to compute the mapping of LSAP in terms of their federal-funds-rateequivalent. Finally, note that by considering all asset prices (except short-term yields) the null hypothesis that the ratio between the LSAPS and TS coefficients is the same across assets cannot be rejected at standard confidence levels (the p-value equals 0.355). Estimator (CUE), to estimate the baseline specification of Equation (2). The GEL estimators are particularly well-suited to estimate the response of asset prices to news because they have better higher order asymptotic and small sample properties compared to the OLS estimator, and are robust to influential observations. Table   5 reports the estimation results (see Rosa, 2011a, Appendix B, for the computational details of the GEL estimators). Importantly, all the results continue to hold. The coefficient of the target, news and LSAP shocks are positive for bond yields and negative for stock and exchange rate returns, and remain highly statistically and economically significant for all asset prices. Moreover, the magnitudes of all regression coefficients are in line with the baseline results of Table 3 , suggesting that the OLS procedure produces reliable point estimates and inferential results. 
where ܴ ௧ା is the asset price return from day ‫ݐ‬ to day ‫ݐ‬ ݇, and the rest of the notation is the same as in Equation (2). To assess the effectiveness of the BoE gilt purchases on U.K. asset prices, I use a high-frequency event-study analysis. More formally, I estimate the following baseline regression model separately for each asset price using only MPC meeting days:
where ܴ ௧ stands for the change in nominal gilts, the FTSE 100 stock price return or the change in the natural logarithm of the British pound exchange rate from 5-min before the news release to 25-min after the event.
The surprise component of the BoE's target decision, ܶܵ ௧ ா , is derived from the change on the 3-month Sterling futures (quoted on the Euronext exchange) in a narrow window around BoE announcements (spanning from 5-min prior to 25-min after the policy announcement). As argued by Joyce, Relleen and Sorensen (2008) , the nearest futures contract to expire is well-suited to measure target shocks because the underlying 3-month Libor rate tracks closely the policy rate, and thus moves in this narrow window only to the extent that there is a policy surprise. Moreover, since the underlying asset is the 3-month interest rate at the time the futures contract expires, this measure of target shocks picks up mostly surprises to the level of the interest rate expected over the coming three months, rather than timing shocks. 10 With regard to the measurement of the surprise component of the Bank of England's QE statements, ‫ܵܧܳ‬ ௧ ா , I apply the same procedure outlined in Section 2.3. The only difference is that I look for those FT articles that contain the keyword "Bank of England", and I extract a total of 71 articles. The MPC meeting held on November 6, 2008, when the BoE policy rate was cut by 150 basis points, is associated with an influence statistic of about 2 (by far, the largest value of the whole sample). 11 To assess the sensitivity of the results, I also estimate Equation (5) by dropping this observation. The bottom part of Table 6 indicates that the TS coefficient becomes larger, and strongly significant. On average, a hypothetical Table 6 is, however, the estimates of the QE impact. The coefficient of the QE shock is, as expected, positive 10 As a sensitivity test, I also use survey data to construct an alternative measure of target shocks. In particular, I define the surprise component of the BoE's decision as the difference between the actual policy rate and the market participants' mean expectation taken from a Bloomberg survey of market economists (see Melvin, Saborowski, Sager and Taylor, 2010, for further details). The empirical findings (available from the author) are robust to this redefinition of the target shock variable. 11 The influence statistics is defined as οߚ መ ௧ Ԣȭ ିଵ οߚ መ ௧ , where οߚ መ ௧ represents the change in the vector of regression coefficients, in this case ൛ߚ ǡ ߚ ்ௌ ǡ ߚ ொாௌ ൟ, resulting from dropping observation t, and ȭ ିଵ stands for the inverse of the estimated covariance matrix of the coefficients.
for gilts, and marginally insignificant for the 10-year yields (p-value equals 10.2%). The impact of asset purchases on the British pound exchange rate is negative, and always significantly different from zero at the 1% level. More specifically, I find that an unanticipated dovish QE announcement of asset purchases, when the market expects no QE statement, is associated with a depreciation of the spot value of the British pound against major currencies of about 0.4%. Overall, the response of U.K. asset prices is broadly in line with the reaction of U.S. asset prices to the Fed's asset purchases. The only exception to this broad pattern is represented by stock prices that somewhat surprisingly do not react to QE shocks. According to the estimates reported in Table 6 the cumulative impact of the QE program in a narrow window around monetary policy announcements is equivalent to an unanticipated cut in the BoE policy rate of about -16-273 basis points (-16-146 basis points in the bottom table). This magnitude is quantitatively similar to response of U.S. asset prices to LSAP news, estimated to be equivalent to a 0-197 basis points shock to the fed funds target rate.
Similar to the U.S., the economic importance of the effects of gilt purchases on asset prices is substantial.
For instance, by including the surprise component of QE, the adjusted R 2 increases from 12% to 28% for the 10-year gilts, and from 24% to 38% for the USD-GBP exchange rate. Table 6 here
To assess how gilt purchases compare to changes in the BoE target rate, I test whether the effects of the QE program in terms of their policy-rate-equivalent are the same across assets. Table 7 reports the Wald test (χ 2 statistic) for each asset pair. In the interest of brevity I summarize the most interesting aspects of the empirical results. For all exchange rates and 10-year yields, the null hypothesis that the effects of unanticipated gilt purchases in terms of their policy-rate-equivalent are not statistically different from each other cannot be rejected at standard confidence levels. The response of stock prices to QE shocks is markedly different from all other asset prices. Finally, also 5-year yields respond significantly less to QE shocks compared to 10-year yields. Table 7 here
The above results are quite robust to changes in the identification strategy of the QE surprises. More specifically, I define ‫ܵܧܳ‬ ௧ ா as the difference between the actual value of gilt purchases announced and market participants' prior expectation of what that value would be. I measure the expected gilt figure using the average survey expectation from Reuters. 12 Importantly, estimation results (available upon request)
confirm that the general message of the paper (i.e., sign and significance of the ‫ܵܧܳ‬ ௧ ா coefficient) survives this sensitivity exercise. It is also reassuring to find that the cumulative financial market impact of gilt purchases on the British pound exchange rate corresponds to an unanticipated cut in the BoE's policy rate that ranges between -3 and 217 basis points when considering the full sample, and between 0 and 184 when considering the sample that excludes the November 2008 meeting.
Conclusions
The goal of this paper is to deepen our understanding of the links between monetary policy and asset prices. In contrast to the existing literature, I investigate the impact of the surprise component of LSAP announcements, rather than the mere presence of an LSAP statement. This is an important methodological advance since according to the efficient market hypothesis asset prices only react to new information. I carry out the econometric analysis in two steps. First, I identify the surprise component of LSAP announcements from Financial Times articles. Then, I incorporate the LSAP news into a formal regression framework, thus controlling for the unanticipated target rate decision and statement regarding the future policy path.
Estimation results document economically large effects of the Fed's asset purchases on U.S. asset prices, corresponding roughly to an unanticipated cut in the fed funds target rate that ranges between 0 (for 3-month yields) and 197 basis points (for 10-year yields). These point estimates are, however, surrounded by considerable uncertainty. By looking at the cross-asset reactions, this work concludes that for most asset prices the effects of asset purchases are not statistically different in the U.S. from an unanticipated cut in the target rate. This study also shows that the response of U.K. asset prices to the Bank of England's gilt purchases has been quantitatively similar to the reaction of U.S. asset prices to the Fed's LSAP program.
The findings of this paper have important policy implications. In particular, this work precisely quantifies the effects of the Fed's LSAP shocks on the U.S. asset prices, and thus it sheds more light on the link between monetary policy and asset prices, and ultimately on the policy transmission mechanism.
Building on the results of this paper, a key direction for future research would be to investigate the channels through which LSAP might help in achieving the Federal Reserve's goals of promoting price stability and maintaining long-run growth. For instance, has the creation of bank reserves increased bank lending? Or has LSAP boosted the confidence in the economic recovery? Furthermore, this study documents that unanticipated LSAP purchases strongly affect asset prices. However, are LSAP optimal? In other words, should central banks buy Treasury bonds to further ease monetary conditions when their policy rate hits the zero lower bound, or are the costs associated with this policy larger than the potential benefits?
Unfortunately, in the absence of a microfounded DSGE model it is impossible to provide a definitive answer. December 6, 2007 , January 9, 2008 , July 24, 2008 , September 29, 2008 , January 16, 2009 , February 7, 2009 , and June 3, 2009 • The plan to buy Treasuries caught investors off guard. "It appears that they wanted to give the market a jolt," said Peter Hooper, an economist at Deutsche Bank. That bias towards monetary easing, absent from its last policy statement, triggered speculation that the Fed would embark on another round of asset purchases to pump money into the economy.
• "The statement has been widely interpreted as paving the way for the next stage of quantitative easing, with November being touted as the most likely date," said Gavan Nolan, credit analyst at Markit.
-1
11/3/2010
• Leaving aside all question of whether LSAP2 will "work" in the long-run, the Fed's shortterm execution has been a triumph. It managed to prepare market expectations so that there were almost no dramatic price moves in response to a formidably complicated policy.
• The central bank's announcement that it would purchase an additional $600bn of longer term Treasury securities by the middle of next year was broadly in line with market expectations.
• The Fed ultimately has delivered something pretty close to central expectations.
0
Table A3 Examples of the Financial Times commentaries about the Bank of England's QE
The table reports selected excerpts of Financial Times commentaries about the Bank of England's QE announcements, together with the value of the signed dummy variable ‫ܵܧܳ‬ ௧ ா . The column "QE amount" stands for the MPC announcement of the total gilt purchases (in billions).
Date
FT commentaries QE amount
2/11/2009
The pound fell sharply yesterday as the Bank of England signalled it was prepared to take unconventional steps to boost the UK economy. NA -1
3/5/2009
• The quantitative easing was widely expected and underscores the authorities' determination to counteract the broad based slump in demand across the UK economy.
• The Bank of England's plan to spend £150bn buying bonds with newly minted money received a general thumbs-up from the City, with many economists expressing surprise at the absolute size of the package.
• Everyone knew that it was going to do this, but the effect of quantifying its quantitative easing was dramatic.
£75 bln -1
5/7/2009
• The Bank's decision to raise the limit by a further £50bn was a bolder move than we, and likely the market, had anticipated.
• The aggressive move came as the markets were starting to question whether the LSAP project was losing momentum.
£125 bln -1
8/6/2009
• The bank's monetary policy committee voted to extend its so-called quantitative easing programme of buying government and corporate bonds from £125bn to an unexpectedly large £175bn.
• After a lacklustre open, the markets responded positively to an unexpected announcement by the Bank of England. The central bank said it would increase the size of its quantitative easing programme to £175 billion from £125 billion. The decision came as a surprise to investors.
• The Bank of England grabbed the spotlight in financial markets on Thursday as its decision to extend its asset-purchase scheme caught investors on the hop.
• The pound dropped sharply on Thursday after the Bank of England announced a more aggressive expansion of its quantitative easing programme than expected.
£175 bln -1 11/5/2009
• Forecasts had been split ahead of the decision as to whether the Bank would deliver an expansion of £25bn or a more aggressive £50bn move, and sterling rallied on the announcement of the amount.
The Bloomberg consensus had been for a £50bn increase although given this masked considerable differences of opinion amongst economists the average of £32.8bn might be a better expression of how the market was positioned.
£200 bln +1
2/4/2010
• As expected, the Bank of England has held rates at 0.5 per cent, and voted against expanding its purchase of government and corporate debt.
• There were no surprises in the Bank of England's decision to halt quantitative easing and hold the base rate in February.
£200 bln 0
Figure 1 The response of exchange rates to the Fed's monetary policy over longer horizons
The figure shows the longer-term impact of target (TS), news shocks (NS), and LSAP news (LSAPS) on U.S. asset prices. The solid lines represent the point estimates and the shaded areas represent ±two standard error bands. The econometric method is Ordinary Least Squares with Heteroskedasticity-Consistent standard errors. The interval spans from one day to ten days after FOMC meeting. Table 1 Financial market impact of large scale asset purchases
The table summarizes some of the choices researchers have made with respect to the data and estimation method used, and reports their main findings. rates on long-term Treasuries, Agency bonds, and highly-rated corporate bonds, but only small effects on no less safe assets (Baa corporate rates). The impact on MBS rates is large only when LSAP involves MBS purchases. Evidence from inflation swap rates and TIPS show that expected inflation increased due to both LSAP1 and LSAP2
Paper
Neely (2010) 25/11/2008-11/4/2009, daily and intraday data U.S. and foreign short-term and long-term bond yields, foreign exchange value of the USD, and equity prices.
Event-study LSAP announcements substantially reduced international long-term bond yields and the spot value of the U.S. dollar. A simple portfolio model explains the changes in foreign bond yields but underestimates the U.S. yield changes.
Wright ( Table 3 The intraday response of U.S. asset prices to the Federal Reserve monetary policy
The table reports the results from regressions of U.S. asset returns on a constant, the target, news and LSAP shock. The dependent variable is the asset price return from 5-min before the event to 25-min after. Table 4 The intraday response of U.S. asset prices to the Federal Reserve monetary policy
The Table 5 The response of equity indices to the Federal Reserve monetary policy: Empirical Likelihood, Exponential Tilting, and Continuously Updating Estimator
The table reports the results from regressions of U.S. asset returns on a constant, the target, news and LSAP shock. The dependent variable is the asset price return from 5-min before the event to 25-min after. Observations on days of scheduled MPC meetings, May 1999 -June 2011. The econometric method is Empirical Likelihood (EL), Exponential Tilting (ET), and Continuously Updating Estimator (CUE). For EL, ET and CUE, I use the following conditional moment restrictions:
where Table 6 The intraday response of U.K. asset returns to the Bank of England monetary policy
The table reports the results from regressions of U.K. asset returns on a constant, the target and QE shock. The dependent variable is the asset price return from 5-min before the event to 25-min after. Observations on days of scheduled MPC meetings, January 1999 -June 2011 (top table) Table 7 The intraday response of U.K. asset prices to the Bank of England monetary policy
The 
